

Barnes, Robert ORCID:

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Introduction to Special Issue on the 60th Anniversary of the Korean War

The sixtieth anniversary of the outbreak of the Korean War is an ideal time to re-explore the history of this complex conflict. For, despite this major landmark, few people in the West have any real sense of when and why this ‘hot’ episode in the otherwise ‘Cold’ War came to pass. The same could almost have been said in academic circles until at least the conflict’s fortieth anniversary. Prior to the release in the 1970s and 1980s of previously classified documents and private papers in the United States, and many countries allied to it, for the pre-war years through to 1953, the orthodox interpretation of the Korean War closely followed President Harry S. Truman’s description of the conflict at the time as an act of Soviet-inspired communist aggression that had to be met¹. Furthermore, in the last two decades, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and China’s emergence as a global Power, evidence has gradually been made available by both Beijing and Moscow. These sources have provided a much clearer picture of the motives and decision-making processes behind the Iron Curtain at the time.

As a result, to describe the Korean War amongst scholars as either ‘forgotten’, ‘unknown’ or even ‘the war before Vietnam’ is now an unwarranted cliché². The significance of this short but intense conflagration in shaping the post-war world, not to mention the risks of a global conflict that it entailed especially in the winter of 1950-1951, have long been appreciated by political, international, military, social and economic historians alike. While the Cold War clearly existed prior to 1950, the Korean War set in motion a chain of events that militarised and globalised this unconventional conflict and shaped international relations until 1989 and beyond. Consequently, in recent years a proliferation of research has been conducted into a wide array of aspects of this unique confrontation. What is more, sharp levels of disagreement persist between historians over a host of issues more than six decades after fighting broke out on the peninsula.

¹ For traditional histories of the Korean see, for example, Karl Berger, *Korean Knot: A Military-Political History* (Philadelphia, 1964); Robert Leckie, *The Korean War* (London, 1963); Glenn Paige, *The Korean Decision, June 24-30, 1950* (New York, 1968); David Rees, *Korea: The Limited War* (London, 1964).

² These phrases were used by historians such as Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-53* (New York, 1987); Bruce Cumings, Bruce and John Halliday, *Korea: The Unknown War* (London, 1988); Rosemary Foot, ‘Making Known the Unknown War: Policy Analysis of the Korean War in the Last Decade’, *Diplomatic History* 15 (1991), 411-31; Callum MacDonald, *Korea: The War Before Vietnam* (Basingstoke, 1986).

This brief introduction, however, will not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the existing literature on the Korean War. Many excellent pieces of work of this nature have already been written³. Instead, it will summarise the six very different chapters contained within this collection, outlining the main themes of each and providing some analysis of the insights of its author. It will then relate these contributions to the developing literature on the Korean War and the relevant current debates that are raging within the historiography. But first it is necessary to say something about this collection as a whole. Its aim is not to cover every aspect of the entire Korean War. It is, rather, to showcase the work currently being undertaken by a series of scholars, at different stages of their careers, from a range of perspectives. Still, these diverse essays share a number of commonalities and certain unifying themes permeate throughout.

To begin with, each essay has a distinct geographical focus. William Stueck and Boram Yi focus on the United States and South Korea; Robert Barnes on the British Commonwealth; Zhihua Shen on the three Communist states involved: the USSR, China and North Korea; while the other contributors concentrate solely on the United States. Moreover, these chapters are united by the fact they each examine an understudied aspect of the conflict. Alliance diplomacy is one such example. While Stueck and Yi, and Barnes, are concerned with relations between the United States and its closest allies, Shen examines the fledgling coalition between Beijing, Moscow and Pyongyang. The central theme in Colin Jackson's work is military policy and the difficult choices faced by the United Nations Command (U.N.C.) in the spring of 1951. Steven Casey, in turn, covers the U.S. domestic political dimension. Furthermore, memory is the essential element in Charles Young's chapter as he asks why the Korean War remains 'forgotten' in the United States today.

Finally, there is a roughly chronological thread running through this collection. Stueck and Yi concentrate on the years between 1945 and 1950. Shen looks at the first months of the war until Chinese intervention. Barnes takes up the story here examining the crisis that followed the arrival of Chinese forces. Jackson then looks at the emergence of the military stalemate in the spring of 1951. Casey's chapter covers the war as a whole but does provide considerable detail regarding the middle years and Eisenhower's election campaign in 1952. While Young looks at the final eighteen months of the conflict and its aftermath.

³ Lester Brune (ed.), *The Korean War: Handbook of the Literature and Research* (Westport, 1996); Foot, 'Making Known the Unknown War'; Kim Hakjoon, 'International Trends in Korean War Studies', *Korean War Studies* (1990) 14:2, 326-70; James Matray, 'Korea's war at 60: A survey of the literature', *Cold War History* 11:1 (2011), 99-129; James Matray, 'The Korean War', in Robert Schulzinger (ed.), *A Companion to American Foreign Relations* (Malden, 2003); Allan Millett, 'A Reader's Guide to the Korean War', *Journal of Military History* (1997) 61:4, 583-97.

This structure provides the book with much coherence, especially for readers less well versed in the events of the Korean War.

As indicated above, the first chapter in this collection, written by William Stueck and Boram Yi, examines the slow and often difficult emergence of the U.S.-South Korean alliance before, during and after the Korean War. Stueck and Yi start by recounting the story of the controversial and hurried U.S. occupation of Korea south of the 38th parallel: the United States Army Military Government in Korea's (USAMGIK) weak and inappropriate policies; General John Hodge's refusal to talk to popular Leftist groups and his reliance initially on the existing Japanese apparatus and then on the conservative landed elite; Washington's general lack of interest in Korea with more pressing Cold War priorities in Europe; the American military's desire to terminate its commitment as quickly as possible; the creation of the Republic of Korea (R.O.K.) under UN auspices in 1948; and the withdrawal of American forces a year later. Yet Stueck and Yi, using new evidence from firsthand accounts, Korean language sources, and U.S. Army documents, provide an original insight into the strained interaction between the occupiers – American officials as well as ordinary soldiers – and the occupied Korean population. They suggest that at the start of 1950 Washington had little interest in building closer bonds with the R.O.K.

Stueck and Yi stress that relations between the occupiers and occupied quickly soured due in large part to the policies adopted by the USAMGIK and existing socio-political divisions within the Korean populace. But they add to the existing literature by emphasising the role played by the disrespectful and often criminal behaviour of U.S. troops toward Koreans. They outline in detail American soldiers' misperceptions of the Korean people as deceitful and treacherous and their belief that Koreans only respected the rule of force. In addition, they write of the common physical assaults inflicted upon ordinary Koreans and their lack of respect for Korean cultural norms, particularly when it came to approaching women. Stueck and Yi blame these problems on the general low level of education amongst the soldiers; the fact many found it difficult to shift from the dehumanising experience of fighting to occupation duties; the lack of morale created by the perceived material impoverishment of serving in Korea; the poor quality officers who failed to discipline their inferiors; and inherent racist attitudes magnified by the victory over Japan. For their part the Korean people felt that Americans at all levels treated them as a conquered nation and did not take into account their legitimate desires for independence and unification.

Stueck and Yi conclude by briefly examining U.S.-South Korean relations post-1948. They stress that Washington was very reluctant to commit militarily to Seoul partly due to greater Cold War priorities but also due to the poor relations that had developed during the occupation. The two historians claim that this half-hearted commitment encouraged the North Korean invasion in June 1950 and argue that the United States grudging intervention in the resulting conflict, 'derived more from concern about its potential impact on the reputation of the United States worldwide than on sympathy for ROK leaders or the Korean people'. Nonetheless, they state that the Korean War had a deep psychological impact and was pivotal in forming a lasting alliance between the two countries that has withstood many upheavals in the international order. The 'second US occupation' and the sacrifice of American troops to protect the R.O.K. allowed Washington to assume the new 'role of elder brother' in the Korean Confucian mindset. The U.S. Government, for its part, treated the R.O.K. more seriously once its forces had proved their value and Seoul had become a major strategic Cold War partner. Even so, the authors note that contemporary U.S.-South Korean relations, while culturally closer than ever, continue to be dogged by lingering resentments and prejudices that have grown as first-hand memories of the conflict have faded.

Alliance diplomacy also forms the core of Zhihua Shen's chapter. Shen examines the delicate triangular relationship that existed between the three Communist powers – the Soviet Union, China and North Korea – during the opening months of the Korean War. At the heart of his study are the controversial behind-the-scenes negotiations between Joseph Stalin, Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung, leading up to Chinese intervention in Korea in October 1950. Using a range of new Soviet and Chinese records, Shen demonstrates that a constant feature of these discussions was whether Moscow would provide air cover for a Chinese invasion. While North Korea was enjoying successes on the battlefield Stalin encouraged Mao in his preparations to deploy forces to Korea, vaguely promising the use of the Soviet Air Force. However, the Soviet leader was hopeful that a quick victory would nullify this commitment. But from late August 1950 military fortunes shifted in favour of the U.N.C. and Kim called for greater materiel support from both Moscow and Beijing. Following the Inchon landings in mid-September Mao finally lost patience and stepped up military planning, determined to prevent an American conquest of North Korea, forcing Stalin to 'give the green light' to Chinese intervention and putting pressure on him to provide Soviet air cover.

Shen reveals that the following weeks witnessed a period of intense crisis within the Communist camp. Stalin vacillated, first agreeing to Mao's demands but later informing

Chinese Premier Zhou En-lai that the Soviet Air Force was in no position to provide cover. Shen claims that Stalin, in fact, feared being sucked into direct conflict with the United States; was wary of Mao's intentions and China's future regional influence; hoped for a peaceful settlement through secret diplomatic channels at the U.N.; and because he was unsure if the U.S./U.N. advance could be halted even if China intervened. The author is deeply critical of Stalin's inconsistencies and reserves praise for Mao's resolution in deciding to send Chinese forces into Korea despite the lack of air cover. He stresses that this action proved crucial as once the Chinese had demonstrated their military effectiveness and anti-American credentials Stalin did commit the Soviet Air Force in early November 1950 to protect the Yalu River border area. Shen states this action sealed the short-term future of the Sino-Soviet-North Korean alliance. In Shen's view, nevertheless, China was left as the 'main force of the alliance' with Moscow thereafter generally supporting Beijing's policies.

Following on both thematically and chronologically from Shen, Robert Barnes examines the diplomatic crisis within the Western alliance that unfolded at the U.N. following Chinese intervention. As he rightly points out, 'historians have lavished enormous attention' on events during these months but they have failed to fully analyse the British Commonwealth's challenge to U.S. hegemony at the U.N. that temporarily constrained the Truman administration's plans to have China branded an aggressor and punished with sanctions. Referencing sources in American, British, Indian, Canadian, and Australian archival and private papers collections, Barnes argues that Commonwealth unity was essential to its success and explains that this occurred when four criteria were fulfilled: when the risk of a global conflict was at its greatest, when key Commonwealth personalities were prepared to exercise their influence in Washington, when coincidence brought the Commonwealth members together, and when the US government was willing to bow to Commonwealth pressure.

Barnes' article starts by outlining the nature of the Commonwealth prior to June 1950, stressing its loose organisation and the inherent divisions between the 'Old Commonwealth' nations (Britain, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa), and the postcolonial 'New Commonwealth' nations of India and Pakistan. Both groups had divergent national interests in the post-war world but Commonwealth membership remained an important aspect of each member's foreign policy for a range of sentimental and practical reasons. Fissures within the Commonwealth, though, were nowhere more evident than at the U.N. where the 'Old' members almost always bowed to U.S. dominance whereas India and, to a lesser extent,

Pakistan had positioned themselves within the neutral camp. Still, Barnes emphasises that the severity of the crisis following Chinese intervention created the conditions necessary for Commonwealth unity as its members feared that the policy pursued by Washington at the U.N. might escalate the conflict into a global war.

Barnes then outlines the various attempts made by the Commonwealth to find a means to reach a negotiated settlement. He demonstrates that despite the deteriorating military situation the Commonwealth persuaded the United States to allow two UN attempts to broker an armistice: first, the creation of the Cease-Fire Committee that unsuccessfully sought to negotiate terms with Beijing; and second, the adoption by the General Assembly of a set of cease-fire 'principles'. In both cases the Truman administration found the Commonwealth difficult to ignore because its members represented its key strategic partners in the Cold War as well as the leading Third World voice. But once the cease-fire 'principles' were rejected by the Chinese, under intense domestic pressure, Washington's willingness to bow to allied opinion evaporated. As a result, Commonwealth unity shattered with only Britain and India remaining steadfast. Importantly, though, British intransigence did prove enough to win one last concession. The U.S. Government altered its resolution so that after China was branded an aggressor one further attempt would be made to find a cease-fire before sanctions were considered. With their major aim achieved and with the military situation improving in late January 1951, all of the Commonwealth members except India now supported the U.S. resolution. Yet Barnes concludes that the Commonwealth challenge had sufficiently diluted American policy and delayed punitive action long enough so that the crisis had begun to pass and the risk of escalation had diminished.

Colin Jackson takes up the story at this point but shifts attention to military policy in the spring of 1951. His chapter critiques the so-called 'lessons' of Korea which shaped Washington's limited war strategy for much of the Cold War. Jackson does this by re-examining the often ignored proposal by General James Van Fleet, Commander of the U.S. Eighth Army, in April 1951 for amphibious landings at Tongchon and an advance north to the narrow 'neck' of Korea stretching between Pyongyang and Wonsan. Basing his findings largely on new Soviet and Chinese evidence documenting cable traffic between Mao and Stalin, Jackson argues that Operation 'Detonate' was feasible on 'purely military grounds'. He states that the Communist forces had exhausted themselves during their failed Spring Offensives whereas the U.N.C. enjoyed considerable firepower, mobility, and logistics advantages. The author thus contends that this episode represented a 'lost chance' to greatly

weaken the enemy, place the U.N.C. in a much stronger negotiating position once armistice talks began, bring about a precipitate and satisfactory end to the conflict, weaken North Korea and strengthen the R.O.K., deter the Communists from future aggression, and undermine the Sino-Soviet alliance. Moreover, he claims there was little risk of escalation since Stalin was unlikely to commit Soviet forces to prevent such a limited advance.

Jackson, therefore, is extremely critical of U.N. Commander General Matthew Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for rejecting Van Fleet's proposal. He dismisses the arguments presented by these figures after 1953 in which they claimed Operation 'Detonate' would have been too costly, risked Soviet intervention, and only have gained territory that would have been later conceded during the armistice negotiations. Instead, Jackson believes their decision was political in nature. He claims Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs were especially cautious because of the domestic crisis revolving around MacArthur's recent dismissal and the concurrent Senate Hearings. The Joint Chiefs were also aware of the NATO allies' opposition to taking any new initiative in Korea and their desire to conserve military resources for Europe. Additionally, Jackson believes Ridgway conflated Van Fleet's limited proposals with the various measures championed by MacArthur before his dismissal that would have in all likelihood escalated the conflict. In conclusion, the author is quick to point out that even Ridgway realised his error afterwards when, only a month later, he reconsidered the idea of an amphibious landing to break the military stalemate.

In his chapter Steven Casey examines a very different aspect of the American experience during the Korean War. He questions how the U.S. public perceives the human cost of war – in terms of American battlefield deaths – and challenges John Mueller's widely influential 'simple association: as casualties mount, support decreases'. Casey argues that this formulation underestimates the reporting techniques used by the military and government to manage public opinion and fails to consider the role of political elites – namely the media and Congress – in scrutinising the official narrative. Taking these factors into account, Casey emphasises that casualty reporting is not automatic and the public gains only a limited knowledge of the true costs of war. To demonstrate his argument, the author first traces the evolution of casual reporting during the two world wars. He then concentrates on the Korean War, which he claims drew from these past examples but also set many new precedents for the limited wars fought by the United States during the Cold War.

The research questions at the heart of Casey's study are: how did the U.S. military publicise casualties in the midst of ongoing battles; what difficulties did they encounter; what

efforts were made by the military to manage the public's reaction; how did the media and Congress, in turn, use these figures to influence opinion; and whether any of these actions actually had an impact on public perception of the conflict in Korea. He concludes that during the first six months of the war, when the fighting was extremely fluid, the previously established theories of casualty reporting were made exceedingly difficult. The military thus struggled to produce accurate figures and keep a close rein on the release of this information. Casey is especially critical of U.N. Commander General Douglas MacArthur for allowing the press present in Korea too much freedom of movement, imposing no form of censorship, and for trying to minimise U.N., and maximise enemy, casualty figures for his own ends. These failings created discrepancies between the official figures released to the public and those reported by the press. Many newspapers and the Republican Right then used the often inaccurate and exaggerated casualty figures coming from journalists in Korea as part of their campaign against the Truman administration. Casey firmly believes that these high casualty figures were definitely a contributing factor in the dip in popularity of the conflict in January 1951 following China's intervention.

Nevertheless, Casey is quick to point out that in the spring of 1951 the U.N.C. imposed limited censorship and restricted the movement of journalists in an effort to regain control over casualty reporting. These measures were made easier as the military situation solidified. Consequently, for over a year the authorities appeared to be in control of the flow of information, the media and Congress appeared to be relatively compliant, and public support for the war remained steady. Even so, Casey stresses that General Dwight D. Eisenhower in his presidential campaign in 1952 referred regularly to high numbers of casualties to successfully drum up support against the Truman administration's limited war strategy in Korea. Based on the experiences of the winter of 1950-1951 and October 1952 the author writes, 'In short, casualties are clearly important. But the specific impact they have on the home front depends on the complex interplay between the military's casualty reporting on the one hand and elite efforts to question the official narrative on the other'.

Finally, Charles Young's chapter covers the conclusion of the Korean War and its aftermath, tackling the theme of memory alluded to at the start of this introduction. Young begins by stressing that despite the rehabilitation of the importance of the Korean War in recent decades within academia, the conflict's 'forgottenness' remains the norm throughout American society as a whole. He states that compared to the two World Wars, that both ended in

resounding victories, and the Vietnam War, that ended in a humiliating defeat, there have been relatively few memorials built or references made in popular culture to the Korean War. Young goes on to explain in detail why, in his view, this is the case. He stresses that this lack of memory stems principally from the conflict's inconclusive end result but also from a number of other aspects of the conflict that he sees as anathema to the American public: its limited nature, the lack of clear war aims, the military stalemate, the prolonged armistice negotiations, the media's disinterest after the first year, and Congressional dissent from both the Right and Left. Young highlights that while the United States had achieved its principle goal of containment, President Eisenhower in July 1953 could hardly have claimed a victory after three years of bitter fighting that left the peninsula divided along almost the same line as it had been in June 1950.

The author believes, nevertheless, that the prisoner-of-war question offered an opportunity to forge a more positive memory of Korea that was not taken. The war had been prolonged by eighteen months precisely because at the armistice talks the U.S. negotiators representing the U.N. argued for the principle of 'voluntary repatriation', stating that prisoners should not be forced to return to their homelands against their will. The fact that the enemy eventually accepted these demands was, Young writes, 'a significant concession from the Communists that national security leaders might have raised high on a banner' since this was 'an epic humiliation: tens-of-thousands of salt-of-the-earth peasant soldiers...turning away from Marxism'. Borrowing from the title of a book by Rosemary Foot, Young thus argues that voluntary repatriation presented 'a substitute for victory'⁴. Nonetheless, despite its obsession with propaganda and the ideological nature of the Cold War, the U.S. Government failed to take advantage of this development. Young blames the fact that voluntary repatriation remained a 'public secret' during and after the termination of the armistice negotiations. He is critical, therefore, of the Truman and Eisenhower administrations for never making voluntary repatriation a war aim. Young claims both Presidents feared that support for continuation of the war would collapse if the public felt American soldiers were being killed in exchange for the freedom of Chinese and Korean ex-Communists.

Evidently, each of the chapters covered in this collection provides an exciting new outlook on the Korean War. Yet they are all part of various traditions and current debates circulating

⁴ Rosemary Foot, *A Substitute for Victory: The Politics of Peacemaking at the Korean Armistice Talks* (Ithaca, 1990).

within the historiography of the conflict. To start, Stueck and Yi contribute significantly to the considerable body of literature on the origins of war, particularly those works that have examined the U.S. occupation of the southern part of the peninsula. Considerable disagreement has arisen on this issue over whether the USAMGIK should be assigned responsibility for the civil strife that led to the outbreak of fighting in 1950. Donald Boose, Choi Sang-Yong, Bruce Cumings, Jeon Sang-Sook, James Matray, as well as Stueck in an earlier work, have all argued that the US Army's miscalculations in working with Japanese authorities and the conservative elite while ignoring the Left, as well as the hasty end of the US occupation, left South Korea without a strong civil administration, creating conditions that led to the Korean War⁵. In contrast, Gregg Brazinsky, Donald Macdonald, Allan Millett, and Park Chan-Pyo, while acknowledging mistakes were made, have defended the USAMGIK's record. They stress that policies implemented during the occupation helped revive the South Korean economy, created an administrative infrastructure, instituted democracy, promoted land reform, and established a fledgling military⁶.

Shen adds to the debate concerning China's decision to intervene in the Korean War that has received a thorough re-examination in recent years as Soviet and Chinese records have become more readily available. The traditional argument, first put forward by Allen Whiting and later repeated by Russell Spurr and Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, claims that Mao sent forces to Korea because the U.N.C. advance to the Yalu constituted a grave threat to China's national security⁷. However, Chen Jian and Zhang Shu Guang have recently contended that Beijing intervened for a range of other reasons: to restore China's Great Power status; promote the Communist revolution at home and abroad; and repay a debt to North

⁵ Donald Boose Jr., 'Portentous Sideshow: The Korean Occupation Decision', *Parameters* (1995) 25:4, 112-29; Choi Sang-Yong, "Trusteeship Debate and the Korean Cold War", in Oh Bonnie B. C. (ed.), *Korea Under the American Military Government, 1945-1948* (Westport, 2002); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 1: Liberation and the Emergence of Separate Regimes, 1945-1947* (Princeton, 1981); Bruce Cumings, *The Origins of the Korean War, Volume 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950* (Princeton, 1990); Jeon Sang-Sook, "U.S. Korean Policy and the Moderates During the U.S. Military Government Era", in Oh Bonnie B. C. (ed.), *Korea Under the American Military Government, 1945-1948* (Westport, 2002); James Matray, 'Hodge Podge: US Occupation Policy in Korea, 1945-1948' *Korean Studies* (1995) 19, 17-38; James Matray, *The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1950* (Honolulu, 1985); William Stueck, *Road to Confrontation: American Policy Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950* (Chapel Hill, 1981).

⁶ Gregg Brazinsky, *Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of Democracy* (Chapel Hill, 2007); Donald Macdonald, *The Koreans: Contemporary Politics and Society* (Boulder, 1998); Alan Millett, *The War for Korea, 1945-1950: A House Burning* (Lawrence, 2005); Park Chan-Pyo, "The American Military Government and the Framework for Democracy in South Korea", in Oh Bonnie B. C. (ed.), *Korea Under the American Military Government, 1945-1948* (Westport, 2002).

⁷ Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, 'China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited', *The China Quarterly* (1990) 121, 94-115; Russell Spurr, *Enter the Dragon: China's Undeclared War Against the U.S. In Korea, 1950-1951* (New York, 1988); Allen Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford, 1970).

Korea for the soldiers it had sent to fight in the Chinese Civil War. Moreover, both historians state that Mao was confident that his guerrilla tactics and the fighting spirit of the ordinary Chinese soldier could inflict a defeat upon the United States and China could withstand atomic attacks⁸. Furthermore, Shen's work builds on the research examining the difficulties experienced within the Communist camp during the Korean War, such as those by Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, Alexandre Mansourov and Robert Simmons⁹.

Barnes' chapter is closely related to three categories of study: international histories of the Korean War, national histories of the role played by individual Commonwealth countries in the conflict, and histories of the U.N.'s involvement. In terms of the first category, William Stueck has produced by far the most considered analysis of alliance diplomacy, paying particular interest to relations between the United States and its allies at the U.N. and beyond¹⁰. With regards to Commonwealth countries, the role of Britain has received considerable attention from Michael Dockrill, Anthony Farrar-Hockley, Rosemary Foot, Michael Hopkins, Peter Lowe and Callum MacDonald¹¹. Two excellent national

⁸ Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York, 1994); Zhang Shu-Guang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-53* (Lawrence, 1995).

⁹ Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, 1993); Alexandre Mansourov, 'Stalin, Mao, Kim, and China's Decision to Enter the Korean War, Sept. 16-Oct. 15, 1950: New Evidence from Russian Archives', *Cold War International History Project Bulletin* No.6/7; Robert Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War* (New York, 1975).

¹⁰ William Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, 1995); William Stueck, 'The Limits of Influence: British Policy and American Expansion of the War in Korea', *Pacific Historical Review* 55:1 (1986), 65-95; William Stueck, *Rethinking the Korean War: A New Diplomatic and Strategic History* (Princeton, 2002).

¹¹ Michael Dockrill, 'The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations, and the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951', *International Affairs* 62:3 (1986), 459-476; Michael Dockrill, 'The Foreign Office, Anglo-American Relations and the Korean Truce Negotiations, July 1951-July 1953', in James Cotton and Ian Neary (eds.), *The Korean War in History* (Manchester, 1989), 100-119; Anthony Farrar-Hockley, *The British Part in the Korean War – Volume I: A Distant Obligation* (London, 1990); *The British Part in the Korean War – Volume II: An Honourable Discharge* (London, 1995); Rosemary Foot, 'Anglo-American Relations in the Korean Crisis: The British Effort to avert an expanded war, December 1950-January 1951', *Diplomatic History* 10:1 (1986), 43-57; Michael Hopkins, 'The Price of Cold War Partnership: Sir Oliver Franks and the British Military Commitment in the Korean War', *Cold War History* 1:2 (2001), 8-46; Peter Lowe, 'An Ally and a Recalcitrant General: Great Britain, Douglas MacArthur and the Korean War, 1950-1', *English Historical Review* 105:406 (1990), 624-653; Peter Lowe, *Containing the Cold War in East Asia: British policies towards Japan, China and Korea, 1948-1953* (Manchester, 1997), 167-269; Peter Lowe, 'Great Britain, Japan, and the Korean War, 1950-1951', *Proceedings of the British Association for Japanese Studies* (1984) Volume 9, 98-111; Peter Lowe, 'Hopes Frustrated: The Impact of the Korean War Upon Britain's Relations with Communist China, 1950-1953', in T. G. Fraser and Keith Jeffery (eds.), *Men, Women and War* (Dublin, 1993), 211-226; Peter Lowe, 'The Frustrations of Alliance: Britain, the United States, and the Korean War, 1950-1951', in James Cotton and Ian Neary (eds.), *The Korean War in History* (Manchester, 1989), 80-99; Peter Lowe, 'The Settlement of the Korean War', in John Young (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of Churchill's Peacetime Administration, 1951-1955* (Leicester, 1988), 207-231; Callum MacDonald, *Britain and the Korean War* (Oxford, 1990).

histories of Canada's experiences have been written by Denis Stairs and John Melady¹². On Australia, Gavan McCormack and Robert O'Neill have provided the best contributions¹³. Ian McGibbon has written the only history of New Zealand in the Korean War¹⁴. And the best account of India's role remains Shiv Dayal's now dated book¹⁵. Graeme Mount has also considered relations between certain 'Old' Commonwealth countries and the United States during the conflict¹⁶. Finally, Barnes' research relates to the works of Tae-Ho Yoo and Leland Goodrich who have both examined the U.N.'s role during the Korean War¹⁷.

Jackson builds upon the vast array of literature covering military aspects of the conflict. A large number of excellent official and unofficial histories have been written concerning the experiences of the various forces that were involved in Korea¹⁸. While these works are too numerous to consider at length here, it is important to point out that very few historians have challenged the orthodox view that by the late spring of 1951 relative parity existed, making any thought of taking the military initiative unrealistic and risky. Van Fleet's proposal for an amphibious landing at Tongchon and a limited advance to the Pyongyang-Wonsan line has thus been largely overlooked except by military historians such as Donald Boose and Allan Millett. These two authors at least partially agree with Jackson's analysis that this represented a 'lost chance' from a military standpoint although they are less critical of Ridgway and the Joint Chiefs given the difficult political situation at the time¹⁹.

¹² John Melady, *Korea: Canada's Forgotten War* (Toronto, 1998); Denis Stairs, *The Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States* (Toronto, 1974).

¹³ Gavan McCormack, *Cold War, Hot War: An Australian Perspective on the Korean War* (Sydney, 1983); Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War, 1950-53 – Volume I: Strategy and Diplomacy* (Canberra, 1991).

¹⁴ Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War – Volume I: Politics and Diplomacy* (Auckland, 1992).

¹⁵ Shiv Dayal, *India's Role in the Korean Question: A Study in the Settlement of International Disputes under the United Nations* (Delhi, 1959).

¹⁶ Graeme Mount, with Andre Laferriere, *The Diplomacy of War: The Case for Korea* (Montreal, 2004).

¹⁷ Leland Goodrich, *Korea: A Study of US Policy in the United Nations* (New York, 1956); Tae-Ho Yoo, *The Korean War and the United Nations: A Legal and Diplomatic Historical Study* (Louvain, 1965).

¹⁸ Roy Appleman, *Disaster in Korea: The Chinese Confront MacArthur* (College Station, 1989); Roy Appleman, *East of Chosin: Entrapment and Breakout, 1950* (College Station, 1987); Roy Appleman, *Escaping the Trap: US Army X Corps in Northeast Korea* (College Station, 1990); Roy Appleman, *Ridgway Duels for Korea* (College Station, 1990); Clay Blair, *The Forgotten War: America in Korea, 1950-53* (New York, 1987); Conrad Crane, *American Airpower Strategy in Korea* (Lawrence, 2000); Ashley Cunningham-Booth and Peter Farrar (eds.), *British Forces in the Korean War* (London, 1988); Alexander George, *The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and its Aftermath* (New York, 1967); Hermes, Walter, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front: The United States Army in the Korean War* (Honolulu, 1992); D. Clayton James, *Refighting the Last War: Command and Crisis in Korea, 1950-1953* (New York, 1993); Ian McGibbon, *New Zealand and the Korean War – Volume II: Combat Operations* (Auckland, 1996); Billy Mossman, *Ebb and Flow: November 1950 to July 1951* (Washington, 1990); Robert O'Neill, *Australia in the Korean War, 1950-53 – Volume II: Combat Operations* (Canberra, 1995); James Schnabel, *The US Army in the Korean War. Policy and Direction: First Year* (Washington, 1992); Shu Guang Zhang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953* (Lawrence, 1995); Xiaoming Zhang, *Red Wings over the Yalu: China, the Soviet Union, and the Air War in Korea* (College Station, 2002).

¹⁹ Donald Boose, *Over the Beach: US Army Amphibious Operations in the Korean War* (Fort Leavenworth, 2008); Allan Millett, *The War for Korea, 1950-1951: They Came From the North* (Lawrence, 2010).

Casey's chapter provides a significant contribution to the small but growing body of literature assessing the Korean War's impact on U.S. domestic affairs. Casey himself has been the most prolific writer in this area in recent years, having published a book and a number of articles revolving around the ways the Truman and Eisenhower administration's attempted to 'sell' the Korean War to the American public and the government's relationship with the political elite²⁰. Still, Ronald Caridi, Robert Ivie, Paul Pierpaoli and John Wiltz have all addressed related issues²¹. Casey's work is also directly connected to the considerable research into the internal workings of the U.S. Government during the Korean War. The best examples of this genre are the studies written by Foot and Burton Kaufman²².

Young's work is also directly connected to the historiography focusing on the influence of the Korean War on U.S. domestic affairs. But as well as this Young makes an invaluable contribution to the body of work on the Korean armistice negotiations, in particular those books centred on the prisoner-of-war question. For a number of decades most historians argued that the motivation behind the inflexible refusal of the United States to return communist POWs to China and North Korea against their will was humanitarian, endorsing Truman's own explanation for his policy²³. In recent years, however, Sydney Bailey, Barton Bernstein and Foot have insisted that the central factor in Truman's thinking was to win a propaganda victory in the Cold War. Moreover, these authors have doubted the legality of voluntary repatriation and been deeply critical of the U.N.C.'s use of Chinese

²⁰ Steven Casey, 'Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilization, 1950-51,' *Diplomatic History* 29:4 (2005), 655-690; Steven Casey, *Selling the Korean War: Propaganda, Politics and Public Opinion* (Oxford, 2008); Steven Casey, "Wilfred Burchett and the UNC's Media Operations during the Korean War, 1951-52," *Journal of Military History* 74:3 (2010), 821-845; Steven Casey, "White House Publicity Operations during the Korean War, June 1950-June 1951," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 35:4 (2005), 691-717.

²¹ Ronald Caridi, *The Korean War and American Politics: The Republican Party as a Case Study* (Philadelphia, 1969); Robert Ivie, 'Declaring a National Emergency: Truman's Rhetorical Crisis and the Great Debate of 1951', in Amos Kiewe (ed.), *The Modern Presidency and Crisis Rhetoric* (London, 1994); Paul Pierpaoli, *Truman and Korea: The Political Culture of the Early Cold War* (Columbia, 1999); John Wiltz, "The Korean War and American Society' Francis Heller (ed.), *The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective* (Lawrence, 1977), 112-58.

²² Rosemary Foot, *The Wrong War: American Policy and the Dimensions of the Korean Conflict, 1950-1953* (Ithaca, 1985); Burton Kaufman, *The Korean War: Challenges in Crisis, Credibility, and Command*, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia, 1997).

²³ For traditional accounts for the Korean armistice negotiations see, for example, Wilfrid Bacchus, 'The Relationship between Combat and Peace Negotiations: Fighting While Talking in Korea, 1953-53', *Orbis* (1973) 17:2, 545-574; Allen Goodman (ed.), *Negotiating While Fighting: The Diary of Admiral C. Turner Joy at the Korean Armistice Negotiations* (Stanford, 1978); Walter Hermes, *Truce Tent and Fighting Front* (Washington, 1966); William Vatcher, *Panmunjom: The Story of the Korean Military Armistice Negotiations* (Westport, 1958).

Nationalist and South Korean guards and agents in the U.N. prisoner camps who used coercion and violence to force prisoners to refuse repatriation²⁴.

On first impressions this collection of essays on the Korean War might appear to be rather eclectic. While it is certainly the case that the topics covered are diverse, on closer inspection, there are a number of themes that resonate throughout. Each of the chapters has a distinct geographical focus, be it the United States, its closest allies, or the three Communist countries involved in Korea. The authors also share an interest in a number of largely ignored themes: alliance diplomacy, military policy, U.S. domestic affairs, and memory. In addition, while these chapters all draw on existing trends in the literature written on this conflict, they each make original and thought-provoking contributions of their own. The issues raised in these pages, therefore, have opened up new avenues of research. Clearly there remain many ‘unknown’ aspects of the Korean War for future generations of historians to uncover.

²⁴ Sydney Bailey, *The Korean Armistice* (Basingstoke, 1992); Barton Bernstein, ‘The Struggle over the Korean Armistice: Prisoners of Repatriation’, in Bruce Cumings (ed.), *Child of Conflict: The Korean-American Relationship, 1945–1953* (Seattle, 1983); Foot, *A Substitute for Victory*; Rosemary Foot, ‘Negotiating with Friends and Enemies: The Politics of Peacemaking in Korea’, in Kim Chull Baum and James Matray (eds.), *Korea and the Cold War: Division, Destruction, and Disarmament* (Claremont, 1993).